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Writing as an organizational communication scholar, I provide a brief descrip-
tion and history of theories encapsulated by the phrase communication is 
constitutive of organizing (CCO). Then, I explain that CCO theory would ben-
efit from an explicit differentiation between which conditions are prerequisite 
to and which conditions ensure the constitution of organization. Specifically, 
I argue that communication may be better thought of as a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for organizing.
CCO Theory
CCO theories articulate a communicative ontology of organization. Although 
the specific mechanisms and processes by which communication is associated 
with organization are debated hotly among theorists, one premise remains con-
stant across the tradition: Communication calls organization into being.
A Brief History
During the interpretive turn in the 1980s, some organizational communication 
scholars began to change their focus from “communicating in organizations” 
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to a keen interest in the “organizing features of [italics added] communication” 
(Cheney, 2000, p. 25). The scholarly project was first and foremost a philo-
sophical shift. These scholars argued that a force present within communication 
creates, calls into being, or otherwise produces organization. In the same 
spirit of this sense, the famed organization theorist, Karl Weick (1969), urged 
scholars to understand organization as the verb, organizing, in that organization 
is produced (often communicatively) action by action. Despite what our 
common language use may represent or reify, organizations are not fixed and 
stable but are rather called into being by interacting and sensemaking persons 
who attempt to coordinate their behaviors to accomplish goals. These philo-
sophical suppositions were eventually crystallized by the phrase communication 
is constitutive of organizing by Putnam and Nicotera (2009), whose edited 
volume is the subject of this forum.
CCO theories trace their history through many roots. Retrospectively, we 
see that some CCO scholars influenced one another, whereas other CCO 
theorists worked simultaneously. For instance, Anthony Giddens’s (1979) work 
is an important chapter in the history of CCO theories. Giddens described 
society as unfolding through time influenced by both structural and agentic 
dynamics. More to the point, he posited a paradox: Structure (i.e., the determin-
ism of cognitive processes or societal influences) and agency (i.e., the 
voluntarism of individuals’ communicative and interpretive choices) are 
mutually constitutive of one another. In other words, Giddens explained 
that society itself is located in a duality of structure in which the enactments 
of agency become structures that, across time, produce possibilities for 
agency enactment. Giddens’s arguments influenced Boden (1994) greatly 
(see p. x). Eventually, Boden applied Giddens’s insights to the workplace.
Boden (1994) demonstrated how the decision making of organizational 
members—in this case, university employees—was governed by local logics 
and turn-taking behaviors. Even more dramatic, Boden articulated how a uni-
versity literally acted through the rhetorical and sensemaking behaviors of 
university employees in a budget meeting. In other words, rather than con-
cluding with an explanation of how the organization’s structure enabled and 
constrained communication, Boden argued that the university employees’ 
meeting talk was ontologically what we come to think of as organization. 
Fairhurst and Putnam (2004) later labeled this strand of organizational research 
based on Giddens’s notion of duality, grounded in action research.
Divergence
In 2000, Taylor and Van Every wrote the groundbreaking book The Emergent 
Organization: Communication as its Site and Surface. Concomitantly, McPhee 
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and Zaug (2000) wrote their influential article “The Communicative Consti-
tution of Organizations: A Framework for Explanation.” Although both are 
foundational CCO works, their specific articulations of the central mecha-
nisms and processes by which communication is associated with organization 
differ. Taylor and Van Every assembled a dizzying number of linguistic, 
interpretive, and critical theories to argue that communication is the location 
and manifestation of organization. Functionally, they argued that organization 
can only be enacted through members’ communication and sensemaking; 
thus, organization is an emergent reality that is constantly in a state of becoming, 
word by word, message by message, and turn by turn. Their analysis attempted 
to link microlevel grammatical structures of language and discourse to rep-
resentations and enactments of coordinated action (i.e., organizing). Within 
Putnam and Nicotera’s (2009) edited volume, chapters by Taylor (2009), 
and to a lesser extent Cooren and Fairhurst (2009), continue to invoke this 
perspective.
McPhee and Zaug (2000), writing at the same time, proposed that organi-
zation may be thought of as arising from four communication flows: activity 
coordination, self-structuring, membership negotiation, and institutional posi-
tioning. In contrast to Taylor and Van Every’s (2000) arguments, McPhee and 
Zaug’s four flow model locates organizing among the microlevel talk of instruc-
tions and commands (i.e., activity coordination), the macrolevel talk about 
how the organization should function and what image it should attempt to 
create (i.e., self-structuring and institutional positioning, respectively), and 
the mesolevel talk of culture and socialization (i.e., membership negotiation). 
Within Putnam and Nicotera’s (2009) edited volume, chapters by McPhee 
and Iverson (2009) and Browning, Greene, Sitkin, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 
(2009) share this perspective.
Ultimately, Taylor and Van Every (2000) may have argued that McPhee 
and Zaug’s (2000, 2009) model of CCO is too broad. In fact, Taylor (2009) 
wrote in his chapter that he agrees with their model; however, he also 
“believe[s] that their program of research needs to be supplemented with a 
more precise theory of communication that has as its objective to trace the 
genesis and grounding of organizational form and process in the communi-
cation event” (pp. 154-155). Conversely, McPhee and Zaug may argue that 
Taylor and Van Every’s model of CCO is too narrow to account for com-
munication’s multifaceted relationship to organization.
Necessary and Sufficient?
A tension between these perspectives is apparent throughout Putnam and 
Nicotera’s (2009) edited volume. Nevertheless, the usefulness of both sets of 
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CCO theories for organization science may be bolstered by a clear explana-
tion of the necessary and sufficient conditions under which communication 
constitutes organization. Organizational communication scholars are fond of the 
argument that communication generates organization because it places the 
study of communication at the center of organization science. However, that 
argument—as demonstrated throughout the pages of this forum—reduces the 
usefulness of CCO theories for organizational studies scholars who hold 
interests outside of communication. Perhaps, one way to enhance the useful-
ness of CCO theories for organization science scholars is to clarify and 
qualify the conditions under which “communication creates organization” 
(Taylor & Cooren, 1997, p. 425).
Necessary and sufficient conditions are logical qualifiers to nomothetic 
causality (Wertheimer, 1968). Although CCO theorists seem to avoid employ-
ing causal propositions, necessary and sufficient conditions may be a useful 
analogy for clarifying and qualifying communication’s relationship to orga-
nization. A necessary condition refers to a circumstance that must be present 
for an effect to have a chance to be present. A sufficient condition refers to a 
circumstance whose mere presence ensures the subsequent presence of an 
effect (Babbie, 2004). CCO theorists tend to blur the distinction between 
these conditions as they argue forcefully for the importance of communication 
in the constitution of organizing. Although it should be noted that McPhee 
and Zaug’s (2000) model seems to be a reaction to attempts to define consti-
tutive features of communication too narrowly.
CCO theories patterned after Taylor and Van Every (2000) seem to presume 
that the presence of specific grammatical structures fulfill both necessary and 
sufficient conditions to ensure the presence of organizing. Likewise, CCO 
theories patterned after McPhee and Zaug (2000, 2009) seem to begin from 
the assumption that activity coordination, self-structuring, institutional 
positioning, and membership negotiation are the necessary conditions for orga-
nizing, whereas their combinations produce the sufficient conditions for 
organizing (see, e.g., Browing et al.’s, 2009, chapter).
For some scholars, coordinated action produced through communication 
is a sufficient condition to ensure the presence of organizing. From this per-
spective, the study of organizing includes the study of “street gangs, virtual 
groups, social movements and more” (Cheney, 2000, p. 25). However, for 
others, a comprehensive ontological explanation of organization must be able 
to distinguish these forms of coordinated action from what we come to call 
organization prima facie. For example, in the present forum, Sillince critiques 
McPhee and Zaug’s (2009) CCO model on the grounds that the model 
could include markets, networking, belonging to a community, and social 
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movements. For Sillince, an accurate account of the ontology of organization 
must be able to distinguish the coordinated action of these forms from the coor-
dinated action that identifies modern organizations.
Clarifying and Qualifying
Other problems exist with presuming communication fulfills the sufficient 
condition for organizing. First, few applications of CCO theories deal explic-
itly with the possibility communication interferes with action coordination and 
organizing. Empirical observations and anecdotal experiences indicate that 
poor workplace talk can lead to inefficiencies, errors, and an inability to 
interrelate heedfully (Bisel, 2009; Weick, 2001). Thus, it stands to reason that 
there must be a point at which the presence of ineffective and inefficient inter-
action produces decay or dissipation of organizing to the extent that the 
existence of organizing is uncertain. In other words, the mere presence of 
communication is not enough to ensure the emergence of organizing because 
communication is ambivalent in the sense that it can facilitate and interfere 
with action coordination, self-structuring, institutional positioning, and mem-
bership negotiation.
Scholars who argue communication fulfills both necessary and sufficient 
conditions for organizing have difficulty explaining episodes of workplace 
talk that impede organizing. However, few would deny that some talk is needed 
to achieve coordinated social action. Thus, claiming that communication ful-
fills the necessary—but not sufficient—condition for organizing may be 
more apt because it qualifies and perhaps strengthens CCO theory. In other 
words, communication is needed for organizing but not enough to ensure 
organization will be constituted because, at times, communication itself may 
undermine organizing.
Second, and in addition to overlooking cases in which communication 
impedes organizing, the CCO project also tends to minimize the importance 
and influence of material constraint, as Reed argued in his following essay. 
In fact, communication scholars point out this inherent flaw and attempt to 
deal with it (e.g., see the chapter by Cooren & Fairhurst, 2009). By describing 
communication as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of organizing, we 
begin to open rhetorical space for critical assessments of the influence of the 
material world in organizing by organizational scholars, including organiza-
tional communication scholars.
Third, Babbie (2004) described reductionism as a paradigmatic ten-
dency to “explai[n] complex phenomena in terms of a single, narrow 
concept or set of concepts. Thus, we ‘reduce’ to a simple explanation what 
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in reality is complex” (p. 101). CCO theories may represent conceptual 
reductionism in that these theories describe the complexity of organization 
in terms of a single domain. Communication is no doubt necessary for 
organization; however, the usefulness of CCO theories is enhanced when 
we qualify and clarify the fact that the mere presence of communication is 
by no means sufficient for the constitution of organization. Written differently, 
communication is not the sine qua non of organization; communication 
is a sine qua non of organization.
Conclusion
One way to move CCO theory forward is to test the boundaries of communi-
cation’s constitutive force. McPhee and Zaug (2009) argued that “all 
communication has constitutive force” in that all communication “consti-
tutes socially recognized agency” and calls relationships into being (p. 28). 
In addition, in their chapter, McPhee and Zaug made the important observa-
tion that “although communication relatively straightforwardly constitutes 
the agency of the communicating parties and aspects of their relationship, the 
constitution of outside objects, especially complex organizations, is itself 
more complex” (p. 28).
I agree with McPhee and Zaug (2009) and argue that the gap between 
communication’s constitution of interpersonal relationships and communica-
tion’s constitution of organizing should be proving ground for CCO theory to 
clarify and qualify the mechanisms and processes by which communication 
comes to constitute organizing. This gap may be bridged by organization 
theory outside of communication theory, or this gap may be bridged by an 
evaluation of how communication relates to the material necessities of orga-
nizing. In sum, CCO theory needs an addendum: Communication is a 
necessary condition for the constitution of organizing, but it is not sufficient 
to ensure organizing will be called into being. Future pioneering work in 
CCO theory will test and articulate the necessary and sufficient conditions 
under which organization is constituted.
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